## SSME <u>EA/CIL</u> REDUNDANCY SCREEN

Component Group:

**Ducts and Lines** 

CIL Item: Part Number: K212-01 RS007032

Component:

**OPB Oxidizer Supply Duct** 

FMEA Item: Failure Mode: K206, K212

Fails to contain oxidizer.

Prepared:

D. Early

Approved: Approval Date: Change #: T. Nguyen 7/25/00

Directive #:

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Phase	Failure / Effect Description	Criticality Hazard Reference
PSMCD 4.1	Oxidizer leakage into aft compartment. Oxidizer leakage results in reduced flow to downstream system(s). Overpressurization of aft compartment. Loss of vehicle.	1 ME-C3P,D, ME-C3S,
	Redundancy Screens: SINGLE POINT FAILURE: N/A	ME-C3M, ME-C3A,C

### SSME FMEA/CIL DESIGN

Component Group:

**Ducts and Lines** 

CIL Item: Part Number: K212-01 RS007032

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**OPB Oxidizer Supply Duct** 

FMEA Item:

K206, K212

Failure Mode:

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Design / Document Reference

#### FAILURE CAUSE: A: Parent material failure or weld failure.

THE DUCT ASSEMBLY (1) IS MANUFACTURED UTILIZING INCONEL 718 AND INCONEL 625 TUBING FOR TEE, AND FLANGE DETAILS. INCONEL 718 WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH, RESISTANCE TO STRESS CORROSION, CORROSION RESISTANCE, HIGH/LOW CYCLE FATIGUE CHARACTERISTICS, AND WELDABILITY (2). INCONEL 718 MATERIALS ARE HEAT TREATED TO DEVELOP FULL MATERIAL STRENGTH AND HARDNESS (2). INCONEL 625 WAS SELECTED FOR ITS WELDABILITY, FORMABILITY, RESISTANCE TO STRESS CORROSION CRACKING, AND CORROSION RESISTANCE (2). ALL MATERIALS USED IN THE DUCT FABRICATION ARE LOX COMPATIBLE (2). FLANGE SECTIONS INCORPORATE RADIUS JOINTS TO REDUCE STRESS CONCENTRATIONS. OFFSET LIMIT REQUIREMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE STRESS CONCENTRATIONS AND IMPROVE WELD GEOMETRY. TUBING STOCK IS DRAWN TO MAINTAIN SURFACE REGULARITY. INSTALLATION IS CONTROLLED FOR ANGULARITY AND OFFSET (3). MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR THE DUCT MEET CEIL REQUIREMENTS (4). HIGH AND LOW CYCLE FATIGUE LIFE MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (5). THIS DUCT ASSEMBLY WAS VERIFIED TO SATISFY PRESSURE CYCLING AND ULTIMATE PRESSURE DVS BY SIMILARITY (6). THE DUCT ASSEMBLY PARENT MATERIALS WERE CLEARED FOR FRACTURE MECHANICS/NDE FLAW GROWTH, SINCE THEY ARE NOT FRACTURE CRITICAL PARTS (7). TABLE K212 LISTS ALL THE FMEA/CIL WELDS AND IDENTIFIES THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE CRITICAL INITIAL FLAW SIZE IS NOT DETECTABLE, AND THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE ROOT SIDE IS NOT ACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTION. THESE WELDS HAVE BEEN ASSESSED AS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT BY RISK ASSESSMENT (8).

(1) RS007032; (2) RSS-8582; (3) RL00630, I.L. 2126-8046; (4) RSS-8546, CP320R0003B; (5) RL00532, CP320R0003B; (6) RSS-511-43; (7) NASA TASK 117; (8) RSS-8756

## SSME FN /CIL **INSPECTION AND TEST**

Component Group:

**Ducts and Lines** 

CIL Item:

K212-01 RS007032

Part Number: Component:

**OPB Oxidizer Supply Duct** 

FMEA Item:

K206, K212

Failure Mode:

Fails to contain oxidizer.

Prepared: Approved: D. Early T. Nguyen

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Failure Causes	Significant Characteristics	Inspection(s) / Test(s)	Document Reference			
A	DUCT		RS007032			
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	RS007032			
	HEAT TREAT	HEAT TREAT IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RA0611-020			
	WELD INTEGRITY	WELD INTEGRITY  ALL WELDS ARE INSPECTED TO DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PER WELD CLASS. INSPECTIONS INCLUDE: VISUAL, DIMENSIONAL, PENETRANT, RADIOGRAPHIC, ULTRASONIC, AND FILLER MATERIAL, AS APPLICABLE.				
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	THE DETAILS ARE PROOF PRESSURE TESTED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	RS007032			
		FILLET RADIUS AT THE TRANSITION AREAS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RA1103-001			
		EXTERIOR SURFACE OF DUCT IS INSPECTED FOR SURFACE DEFECTS PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	RS007032			
		THE ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	RS007032			
		AFTER PROOF PRESSURE TEST WELDS ARE PENETRANT INSPECTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RA0115-116			
	FLIGHT FLOW TESTING	THE EXTERNAL SURFACE IS VISUALLY INSPECTED PRIOR TO EACH LAUNCH.	OMRSD V41BU0.030			
		A HELIUM SIGNATURE LEAK TEST IS PERFORMED PRIOR TO EACH LAUNCH. (LAST TEST)	OMRSD S00000.950			

Failure History:

Comprehensive failure history data is maintained in the Problem Reporting database (PRAMS/PRACA)

Reference: NASA letter SA21/88/308 and Rocketdyne letter 88RC09761.

Operational Use: Not Applicable.

# SSME FMEA/CIL WELD JOINTS

Component Group:

Ducts and Lines

CIL Item: Part Number:

K212 RS007032

Component:

OPB Oxidizer Supply Duct K206, K212

FMEA Item:

Prepared: Approved:

D. Early T. Nguyen 7/25/00

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Component	Basic Part Number	Weld Number	Weld Type	Class	Root Side Not Access	Critical Flaw Si Detect	ze Not	Comments
DUCT	RS007032	1	GTAW	1				
DUCT	RS007032	2	GTAW	1				
DUCT	RS007032	3	GTAW	1		x		
DUCT	RS007032	4	GTAW	ı				